Evaluating the role of risk networks on risk identification,
  classification and emergence by Ellinas, Christos et al.
1 
 
Evaluating the role of risk networks on risk identification, classification 
and emergence 
Christos Ellinas1,2,*, , Neil Allan1,2, Caroline Coombe3 
1 University of Bristol, Bristol, UK 
2 Systemic Consult Ltd, Bradford-on-Avon, UK   
3ORIC International, UK 
 
*Corresponding author 
E-mail: ce12183@bristol.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Modern society heavily relies on strongly connected, socio-technical systems. As a result, distinct risks 
threatening the operation of individual systems can no longer be treated in isolation. Consequently, risk 
experts are actively seeking for ways to relax the risk independence assumption that undermines typical 
risk management models. Prominent work has advocated the use of risk networks as a way forward. 
Yet, the inevitable biases introduced during the generation of these survey-based risk networks limit 
our ability to examine their topology, and in turn challenge the utility of the very notion of a risk 
network. To alleviate these concerns, we proposed an alternative methodology for generating weighted 
risk networks. We subsequently applied this methodology to an empirical dataset of financial data. This 
paper reports our findings on the study of the topology of the resulting risk network. We observed a 
modular topology, and reasoned on its use as a robust risk classification framework. Using these 
modules, we highlight a tendency of specialization during the risk identification process, with some 
firms being solely focused on a subset of the available risk classes. Finally, we considered the 
independent and systemic impact of some risks and attributed possible mismatches to their emerging 
nature.  
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Key messages 
 The authors introduce a novel methodology to generate risk networks, which relaxes some 
assumptions of past related work, including prominent work by the World Economic Forum. 
 The risk network can serve as a robust risk classification framework, free from externally-
imposed artificial constructs (e.g. risk classification based on regulatory requirements). 
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 By applying it to a (re)insurance dataset, the authors use the resulting risk network to evaluate 
the ‘horizon scanning’ capacity of every included firm. 
 The risk network uncovers a general mismatch between independent and systemic impact of 
risks, with authors arguing that this mismatch can be used to classify certain risks as ‘emerging’.  
Introduction 
Enhanced understanding on the nature of risk is the epitome of modern science (Bernstein & Bernstein 
Peter, 1996; Buchanan & O Connell, 2006), with its successful management yielding significant 
benefits across a wide range of societal facets (Ganin et al., 2016; Helbing, 2013; Vespignani, 2012). 
In this context, risk is traditionally defined as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives”; it is generally 
quantified as the probability of an event materializing, times its expected impact (ISO, 2009). The 
objective of risk management is thus, to mitigate against events that can lead to an undesirable outcome 
(Pritchard, 2014).  
Underlying this objective is the assumption that each such adverse event is independent e.g. 
interdependence bears no effect when quantifying risk (ISO, 2009). Yet, the operation of modern 
society largely depends on precisely this interdependence (World Economic Forum, 2017), as it 
supports the global exchange of “people, goods, money, information, and ideas” (Helbing, 2013). 
Incorporating the effect of interdependence into the risk management process has attracted much recent 
interest (Battiston, Caldarelli, D’Errico, & Gurciullo, 2016; Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca, & 
Caldarelli, 2012; DasGupta & Kaligounder, 2014; Helbing, 2013; Roukny, Bersini, Pirotte, Caldarelli, 
& Battiston, 2013; Szymanski, Lin, Asztalos, & Sreenivasan, 2015) partly due to the 2007 – 2008 global 
financial crisis and the way in which traditional risk models, also grounded on the assumption of risk 
independence, failed to foresee it (Battiston, Caldarelli, et al., 2016; Battiston, Farmer, et al., 2016; 
Besley & Hennessy, 2009; Schweitzer, Fagiolo, Sornette, Vega-Redondo, & White, 2009).  
One way of exploring the effect of risk interdependence is by considering how risks interact (Helbing, 
2013; Szymanski et al., 2015). A prominent example of this approach can be found in the annual ‘Global 
Risk Report’, generated by the World Economic Forum (WEF). Currently in its 12th edition, this report 
explicitly explores the effect of risk interdependence by considering risk networks. Within each 
network, a risk (node) is connected, via weighted links, to a number of other risks. In this particular 
example, links are established through a survey of roughly 750 experts – from government, academics 
and industry – with participants being asked the following: “Global risks are not isolated and it is 
important to assess their interconnections. In your view, which are the most strongly connected global 
risks? Please select three to six pairs of global risks?” (see Appendix B in (World Economic Forum, 
2017)).  
3 
 
This question focuses on describing the local structure of the risk network, and is a variant of the so-
called ‘name generator’ – a tool often deployed by surveys which focus on constructing the overall 
structure of (mostly social) networks using ego networks (Bidart & Charbonneau, 2011; Merluzzi & 
Burt, 2013). Despite the wide deployment of  these ‘name generators’ (Merluzzi & Burt, 2013), the 
resulting data must be approached with caution due to their inevitable exposure to multiple sources of 
contamination (Bearman & Parigi, 2004; Bidart & Charbonneau, 2011; M. Newman, Barabasi, & 
Watts, 2011). In the case of the WEF report, the derived risk network must be regarded with skepticism, 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, participants are explicitly given an upper and lower bound on the 
number of connections that they can utilize, inevitably biasing the overall connectivity of the risk 
network. Secondly, the nature of the link implied through the questionnaire is ambiguous, as a link 
between two risks may suggest: (a) a causal link (i.e. Risk A causes Risk B and hence, they are 
connected) or, (b) a similarity link (i.e. Risk A is similar to Risk B, and hence, they are connected). 
This accumulating ambiguity can undermine the consequent analysis of the resulting risk network. For 
example, consider the most connected risk. If (a) is the case, then this risk is expected to play a key role 
in terms of triggering large-scale cascades i.e. be of high systemic importance (Albert & Barabási, 
2002). Yet if (b) is the case, such heightened connectivity merely suggests that its neighboring risks are 
somewhat similar. The impact of this ambiguity becomes even harder to evaluate once sophisticated 
analysis is applied on top of such networks. For example, consider the recent work of Szymanski et al. 
(2015), who have used the WEF risk network to analyze its failure dynamics. Despite the theoretical 
rigor of the analysis itself, its inevitable dependence on the network’s topology questions the eventual 
outcome of the analysis, since the ambiguity contained within the network itself is neither evaluated 
nor accounted for.  
Working towards capturing risk interdependence in a more robust way, we developed a methodology 
to generate weighted risk networks based on risk similarity, where risks are connected based on the 
similarity of their characteristics. By applying this methodology to an empirical dataset of 143 risks – 
each described using 24 unique tags – this paper discusses the role of risk interdependence in terms of 
three core components of the risk management process: (a) risk classification which is independent of 
externally-imposed labels; (b) evaluation of the ‘horizon scanning’ capacity of a given firm; (c) 
identification of emerging risks – based on the influence of interconnectivity on their independent 
impact – and how they underlie firm interactions. 
Results  
In what follows, we analyze the topology of the risk network, particularly focusing on its modular 
composition (see Supporting information (SI) for detailed visualizations). We then evaluate the capacity 
of each firm to identify risks uniformly across all observed modules – an ability to do so corresponds 
to an enhanced ‘horizon scanning’ capacity. Finally, we use a simple epidemic model (Gutfraind, 2010; 
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Pastor-Satorras, Castellano, Van Mieghem, & Vespignani, 2015; Watts, 2002) to evaluate the systemic 
importance of each risk, in terms of its ability to trigger subsequent risks. By doing so, we compare the 
reported independent impact of each risk with its evident systemic one, attributing possible differences 
to their ‘emerging’ nature. The consequent interaction between firms is briefly evaluated, in the form 
of liability networks.  
Emergence of risk modules 
In the context of the risk network, our analysis identifies five distinct modules, composed of 47 (Module 
1), 35 (Module 2), 25 (Module 3), 21 (Module 4) and 16 (Module 5) risks respectively – see Figure 1. 
A module is defined as a group of nodes densely connected between each other yet loosely connected 
with nodes that belong to different modules (Danon, Diaz-Guilera, Duch, & Arenas, 2005; Fortunato, 
2010). In the context of the risk network, every module can be regarded as a distinct ‘risk class’, where 
its formation solely depends on the underlying characteristics of each risk (see Method). This bottom-
up approach contrasts typical risk classification schemes, where a top-down approach is generally 
adopted, building on externally-imposed labels i.e. based on a particular organizational function, e.g. 
‘Strategic Risk’ (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012), or a regulatory requirement, e.g. ‘Capital Ratio’ from the 
Basel III regulatory framework (Basel Committee, 2010)).  
Increased levels of connectivity correspond to increased levels of risk similarity, both in terms of intra-
connectivity (within a module) and inter-connectivity (between modules). Consequently, if a given set 
of conditions triggers a particular risk, the same condition(s) will also affect (and potentially trigger) its 
neighboring nodes, depending on how similar they are in terms of their underlying characteristics 
(Allan, Cantle, Godfrey, & Yin, 2013). With risk similarity in mind, consider the case of Module 2 – 
heightened intra-connectivity indicates that the risks contained within it are increasingly similar; 
conversely Module 3 is defined by relatively low levels of intra-connectivity. Shifting focus to the inter-
connectivity aspect, heightened inter-connectivity identifies related risk classes – the strong link 
between Module 2, composed of regulatory risks, and Module 5, composed of political risks, serves as 
an intuitive example. 
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Figure 1: Risk Network, where a weighted link between two nodes (risks) reflects their similarity, in 
terms of their risk characteristics. Node color corresponds to the firm who reported it; node size 
corresponds to its degree and link color corresponds to link weight. Additional information can be found 
in (ORIC International, 2017). 
With respect to the actual composition of each module, it is of particular interest to identify risks that 
contradict the overall theme of each module. For example, Module 3 is principally composed of cyber-
related risks, evident by the word-decomposition of the risk labels found within the module (see Section 
2, SI). Amongst these cyber-related risks, the risk ‘Global Population Changes’ is also present – a rather 
counter-intuitive inclusion at first, yet one that is deeply embedded within the technological realm of 
Module 2. One can easily reason that health is highly dependent on the rate of technological 
advancement, which in turn affects the population size. Yet in the case of traditional risk classification, 
‘Global Population Change’ would have been grouped under a distinctly different label (e.g. ‘Insurance 
and Demographic Risk’ (Kelliher, Wilmot, Vij, & Klumpes, 2013)) compared to the rest of the risks 
contained in Module 2. More generally, these risk modules can uncover risks which are seemingly 
distinct in terms of their attributed label – such as the case with ‘Global Population Changes’ – yet are 
increasingly similar in terms of their underlying characteristics, which in turn suggests some sort of 
similarity in the way for mitigating against them. 
Evaluation of ‘Horizon Scanning’ capacity 
The risk management process can be summarized as a process aimed to “Identify to Analyze to Evaluate 
to Treat” a particular risk (ISO, 2009). With ‘horizon scanning’ being the first step in this process, a 
firm capable of identifying risks across all ‘risk classes’ limits its exposure to unidentified risks. By 
considering the basis on which the network is developed, this insight becomes intuitive: when a firm 
identifies, and eventually treats, a risk of a given class the firm inevitably becomes somewhat shielded 
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from the impact of similar risks i.e. risks that belong to the same class (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
Conversely, the tendency of a firm to identify risks from particular ‘risk classes’ biases its ‘horizon 
scanning’ function, and in turn, increases its overall risk exposure, especially if entire ‘risk classes’ 
remain uncovered. 
Table 1 details the ‘horizon scanning’ capacity of each firm, as reflected by the number of risks 
identified in each of the five ‘risk classes’ (reported in the form of a percentage). An example of the 
aforementioned bias towards missing particular ‘risk classes’ is Firm A, with its ‘horizon scanning’ 
deployment specializing in risks that belong to Module 1, 3 and 5 (Figure 2; blue). As a result, Firm A 
is unaware of the risks that belong to Module 2 and 4. Conversely, Firm O is able to identify at least 
one risk across all five modules (Figure 2; red), and hence is well-equipped to tackle risks which have 
remained unidentified yet are contained within these five modules. 
More generally, the majority of firms appear to specialize in the identification of risks that belong to 
particular risk classes. In other words, firms tend to tailor their ‘horizon scanning’ function towards the 
identification of risks of a particular nature (i.e. risks that belong to the same module). Network-based 
techniques can highlight these instances and help mitigate them by broadening the focus of the 
corresponding ‘horizon scanning’ function.  
 
 
Figure 2: ‘Horizon scanning’ capacity of Firm O (red) and Firm A (blue), in terms of identifying risk 
across the network. Firm O successfully identifies at least one risk from each module, while Firm A is 
limited to Module 1, 3 and 5. Subplot includes the corresponding histogram. Additional information 
can be found in (ORIC International, 2017). 
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Table 1: Percentage of risk(s) identified by each firm across the five modules. Each percentage 
corresponds to the number of risks identified over the total number of risks reported by the 
corresponding firm. Results are rounded to 1 decimal place. Note that every Firm ID corresponds to a 
firm contained within the dataset, anonymized for confidentiality purposes.  
Firm 
Module 
1 2 3 4 5 
A 35.7% 0.0% 35.7% 0.0% 28.6% 
B 44.4% 16.7% 16.7% 22.2% 0.0% 
C 61.5% 7.7% 15.4% 7.7% 7.7% 
D 14.3% 50.0% 14.3% 14.3% 7.1% 
E 60.0% 30.0% 0.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
F 33.3% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
G 33.3% 16.7% 0.0% 33.3% 16.7% 
I 28.6% 7.1% 35.7% 7.1% 21.4% 
J 44.4% 22.2% 0.0% 22.2% 11.1% 
K 0.0% 42.9% 42.9% 14.3% 0.0% 
L 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 
M 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
N 0.0% 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 0.0% 
O 36.4% 18.2% 9.1% 9.1% 27.3% 
Q 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 0% 
Identifying emerging risks and who they affect 
An emerging risk can be defined as “a material, previously unconsidered risk or changing risk factor 
that has the potential to significantly alter the firms’ risk profile” (ORIC International, 2017). These 
risks are “developing or already known risks which are subject to uncertainty […] and are therefore 
difficult to quantify using traditional risk assessment techniques” (International Actuarial Association, 
2008). In this context, we translate this uncertainty as the way in which interconnectivity affects the 
systemic impact of a risk, in relation to its independent impact. In other words, an emerging risk is one 
in which its position in the network alters its independent impact, either in a positive or a negative 
impact.  
The independent impact of every risk considered herein is reported in a qualitative manner (i.e. ‘High’, 
‘Medium’ or ‘Low’) by its respective firm, as set by the industry standard ISO 31 000 (ISO, 2009). The 
systemic impact is evaluated using a simple threshold model (Gutfraind, 2010; Pastor-Satorras et al., 
2015; Watts, 2002), which essentially models a cascade in which a risk materializes, and subsequently 
triggers related risks in a probabilistic manner, depending on the risk similarity of a risk pair (see 
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Method). The final number of risks consequently affected by the initially affected risk corresponds to 
its systemic impact. As such, a risk whose materialization in turn triggers a large number of subsequent 
risks is assigned a high systemic impact, and vice-versa.  
Overall, a general mismatch exists between the independent and systemic impact across the most 
influential risks, which indicates that the assumption of risk independence obscures the emerging nature 
of risks (Figure 3). This misalignment is consistent across most firms, highlighting an overall tendency 
to underestimate the increased systemic impact of particular risks. Consider Risk IDX 118 (‘European 
data protection rules’), which has been assessed to have a ‘Low’ independent impact, yet it is of ‘High’ 
systemic impact (triggers an average of 32.9 subsequent risks; ranks 4th out of the 143 risks) – see Table 
2. In other words, the assumption of risk independence conceals the systemic nature of these risks, and 
in turn shrouds its emerging nature.  
 
Figure 3: Breakdown of independent (1st column) and systemic impact (2nd column) for every risk, 
grouped by the firm who has reported it. Bar color corresponds to the size of impact. Additional 
information can be found in (ORIC International, 2017). 
Table 2: Top five risks in terms of their systemic impact. Independent impact is also included, along 
with the firm which has reported each risk. Note that every Firm ID corresponds to a firm contained 
within the dataset, anonymized for confidentiality purposes. 
Trigger 
Risk IDX 
Risk Title 
Firm who 
identified Risk 
Systemic 
Impact 
(Rank) 
Independent 
Impact 
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65 
'Political intervention (tax, 
caps, levies, rating factors, 
data etc.)' 
'J' High (1st) Medium 
12 
'Brexit and Scottish 
independence' 
'F ' High (2nd) Medium 
107 
'Legal action driving changing 
claims patterns' 
'B' High( 3rd) Medium 
118 
'European data protection 
rules' 
'B' High (4th) Low 
13 
'Mandate extension to 
commercial properties' 
'F ' High (5th) Medium 
 
The consequent interaction between firms, as it emerges through the systemic nature of each risk, can 
be examined by considering the liability network. In this case, each node corresponds to a firm, and a 
link between firm 𝑖 and 𝑗 reflects the ability of at least one risk reported by firm 𝑖 to interact with at 
least one risk reported by firm 𝑗. In addition, link weight corresponds to the number of times all risks 
reported by firm 𝑖 interact with risks reported by firm 𝑗 (Figure 4). This weight is normalized over the 
total number of risks reported by firm 𝑖 in order to account for the variability in the number of risks 
reported by each firm. Note that despite the symmetry in link directionality, this normalization scheme 
allows for a link between firm 𝑖 and 𝑗 to be of different weight compared to the link between firm 𝑖 
and 𝑗; thus we consider the liability network to be directed. 
The liability network can be used to identify firms that are heavily exposed to the systemic impact of 
particular risks, and highlight possible collaborations. For example, Firm D is the one most affected, 
evident by the largest weighted in-degree (proportional to node size; Figure 4, Left Panel). In addition, 
the largest contribution comes from risks that have been reported by Firm F. In other words, risks which 
have been reported by Firm F are very similar to the ones reported by Firm D, and in turn are 
increasingly likely to affect the former (Firm F). Similarly, risks reported by Firm F have a high 
systemic impact (Figure 4; Right Panel); making Firm F a key collaborator from which information 
sharing can benefit affected firms, such as Firm D. Therefore, one can envision a collaboration between 
Firm F and D in an attempt to prevent risk more efficiently.  
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Figure 4: Liability network, where each node corresponds to a firm, and a link between firm 𝑖 and 𝑗 
reflects the capacity of at least one risk by firm 𝑖 to interact with a risk reported by firm 𝑗. The weight 
of a link from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 corresponds to the total number of times a risk identified by firm 𝑖 has 
affected a risk identified by firm. Node size is proportional to the in-degree (Left Panel) and out-degree 
(Right Panel) of each node. 
Discussion 
In this paper, we have presented an evaluation of how risk interdependence affects the risk management 
process. In contrast to previous studies, which focus on survey-based risk networks, we have introduced 
an empirical-based, quantitative risk network. In this respect, we have focused on: (a) the emergence of 
network modules, (b) the ‘horizon scanning’ capacity of individual firms, and (c) emergent risks and 
how they reflect firm interactions.  
Modules within the risk network provide an intuitive way for classifying risk. Typically, risk 
classification takes place within the boundary of individual firms through the imposition of, what is 
hoped to be, meaningful labels. Each such label relates a particular aspect of a firm to its economic 
value e.g. ‘Market Risk’ relates market movement to fluctuations in the value of existing assets, which 
in turn impacts a firm’s liabilities and income. Yet such classification is driven by externally-imposed 
labels which can fuel ambiguity, resulting in similar risks being grouped differently. A recent report by 
the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries highlights this inconsistency by the means of an example, where 
“one organization may class failure of a project as Operation Risk, while another class it as Strategy 
Risk” (Kelliher et al., 2013). Transitioning from high-level risks – such as the ones considered herein – 
to low-level risks fuels the frequency of such inconsistencies further, as the number of possible labels 
that can be attributed to any one risk explodes (Kelliher et al., 2013). 
In contrast, the methodology proposed herein provides an intuitive way for classifying risk. By looking 
beyond a risk’s label, the explicit focus on a risk’s underlying characteristics ensures that the 
classification process is not obscured by externally imposed labels. Rather, the focus is on risk 
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similarity, ensuring that risks belonging to the same module are in fact, alike. As a result, these modules 
can include risks that are similar in principle, yet described by seemingly unrelated labels with respect 
to the rest of the module. Consequently, resources spent in managing risks that appear to be different, 
yet are fundamentally similar – i.e. they belong to the same risk module – can be saved, effectively 
streamlining the risk management process.  
By exploiting the emergence of these modules, a firm can navigate towards enhanced ‘horizon 
scanning’ capabilities, by identifying a diverse set of risks i.e. across all identified network modules. 
Considering the similarity-based construction of the risk network, the ability to identify risks from each 
module suggests that even though a firm may have missed some risks, its overall preparedness is high 
as the remaining risks within that module are similar in nature. Overall, our work shows that the majority 
of firms specialize in the identification of risks that are of similar nature (i.e. risks that belong to the 
same ‘risk class’). Whilst such specialization is understandable, it can also increase risk exposure due 
to unidentified risks creeping in. Introducing network-based techniques into the overall risk 
management process can help contain this effect, improving the overall effectiveness of the risk 
management process.  
Finally, we consider the effect of interconnectivity in terms of a possible mismatch between the 
independent and systemic impact of any given risk – we refer to risks that exhibit this mismatch as 
emerging risks. Focusing on risks where interconnectivity has a worsening effect, we are able to identify 
risks with small independent impact, yet capable of larger systemic impact. Such insight can be used to 
minimize biases introduced by traditional tools (e.g. risk registers (ISO, 2009)), where attention is 
skewed towards risks with a high independent impact. In doing so, the likelihood of omitting risks with 
low independent impact, yet potentially high systemic impact can be minimized. In addition, by 
translating the systemic impact of each risk into a liability network, we can identify beneficial 
collaborations between firms, where the neighbor of a firm can hold valuable information with respect 
to the risks that impact it (e.g. Firm D and F; Figure 4). In principle, one could envision such information 
to be used in order to promote mutually beneficial collaborations that can increase risk mitigation 
efficiency.  
With that in mind, it is worth highlighting that firms are complex, multi-faceted systems operating 
across a wide range of environments (e.g. regulatory, commercial etc.). Therefore, the utility of the 
liability network in identifying joint exposures that emerge from this rich variety of dependencies 
depends on a priory information. Consider a simple example where contractual dependencies have been 
analyzed, and the risk of heavy reliance to a particular partner identified. On the one hand, if this risk 
is appropriately recorded, then it’s contribution to the liability network will be present; on the other 
hand, if the risk has been omitted then the liability network will be inevitably incomplete, and hence its 
utility diminished. 
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In conclusion, the use of quantitative risk networks can significantly contribute to the spurring 
discussion on the interdependent nature of risk, and its effect. The ability to map risk interdependence 
in the form of network modules provides for a natural way to classify risk, which in turn can provide 
an intuitive way to reduce the number of risks that can be managed from several hundred to a handful, 
focusing the risk management effort. With that in mind, strategies can be formulated to prevent the 
occurrence of multiple risks that belong to the same class, and therefore increase effectiveness and 
efficiency of the overall risk management process. In addition, the capacity to evaluate possible 
limitations in the ‘horizon scanning’ capacity of a firm can provide valuable insight on possible 
exposures, whilst the capacity to identify emerging risks contributes to the reduction of a firm’s 
exposure to large-scale, systemic failures. 
Methods 
Data 
The risk dataset has been obtained from ORIC International – an operational risk consortium for the 
(re)insurance and asset management sector (www.oricinternational.com). The dataset contains 143 
unique risks, as reported from 15 firms active in the (re)insurance sector.  
Every risk 𝑖 is characterised by a row vector 𝑐𝑖 =  𝑐1
𝑖 , 𝑐2
𝑖 , 𝑐3
𝑖 , … , 𝑐24
𝑖  where each entry is binary and 
reports whether a particular theme tag is present. The set of risk characteristics considered is provided 
in Table 3; the raw data is available in the SI.  
Table 3: Set of characteristics used to describe the 143 risks. 
Risk Characteristics 
1. 'Natural 
Disasters' 
2. 'Pandemic/ 
Health' 
3. 'Underwriting 
experience' 
4. 'Statutory / 
Regulatory 
changes' 
5. 'DR/BCP' 
Business 
contingency 
planning 
6. 'Investments' 
7. ‘Capital 
modelling' 
8. 'Political 
instability' 
9. 'Climate' 10. 'Outsourcing' 
11. 'Cyber' 
12. 'Technology/ 
Data' 
13. Competition/ 
Distribution 
channels' 
14. 'Consumer 
behavior' 
15. 'Terrorism/ 
War' 
16. 'Credit/ 
Market 
shocks' 
17. 'Operational 
disruption' 
18. 'War/Terrorism' 19. 'Claims' 20. 'Pricing' 
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21. 'Customer 
service' 
22. ' Crime' 23. ' Reputation ' 24. ' Data'  
Risk Network Generation 
In general, a network 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐸) is composed of a set of nodes 𝑁, 𝑁 ≡ {𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑁} and edges 𝐸, 𝐸 ≡
{𝑒1, 𝑒2, … , 𝑛𝐸}. The structure of the network is stored in an 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix, called the adjacency 
matrix, 𝐀. A non-zero 𝐀(𝑖, 𝑗) entry corresponds to a link between node 𝑖 and 𝑗 with a weight equal to 
the magnitude of the entry.  
To generate a risk network, we first construct a similarity matrix 𝐒, where 𝐒(𝑖, 𝑗) records the similarity 
between risk 𝑖 and 𝑗 (see Section 3, SI). This similarity is quantified using the Cosine Distance between 
the two corresponding characteristics vectors 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐𝑗, defined as: 
 
𝑑𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑐𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑗
√(𝑐𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑖)(𝑐𝑗 ∙ 𝑐𝑗)
 (eq.1) 
Once 𝐒 is constructed, we adopt a simple probabilistic method to generate an ensemble of 1,000 
undirected networks. In detail, a link from risk 𝑖 to risk 𝑗 (and vice-versa) is introduced with a 
probability equal to their similarity i.e. increasingly alike risks are more likely to be linked. In addition, 
increasingly similar risks are expected to have stronger links i.e. the link weight is directly proportional 
to their similarity.  
Module identification 
Every module corresponds to a particular partition 𝑁∗ = {𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝐿} of network 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐸). One way for 
identifying appropriate modules is to define a quality function 𝑄(𝐺,  𝑁∗), where its value characterizes 
how good 𝑁∗ is a partition of 𝐺. Hence, the optimum set of modules can be obtained by maximizing 𝑄.  
To do so, we use an implementation of Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, and Lefebvre (2008)’s 
algorithm, which utilizes a weighted variant of the Newman-Girvan modularity measure (Girvan & 
Newman, 2002; M. E. Newman, 2006), as an appropriate 𝑄. This measure essentially accounts for the 
density of the links inside a given partition, compared to the links between the partitions. In the case of 
a weighted network, it is defined as (M. E. Newman, 2004): 
 
𝑄 =
1
2𝑚
∑ (𝐀(𝑖, 𝑗) −
𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗
2𝑚
) 𝛿(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗)
𝑖,𝑗
 (eq.2) 
where 𝑘𝑖, defined as ∑ 𝐀(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑗,𝑖≠𝑗 , reflects the sum of the weights of links attached to node 𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 
corresponds to the module where node 𝑖 is assigned, Kronecker delta 𝛿 is 1 if 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗 and 0 otherwise, 
and finally, 𝑚 =
1
2
∑ 𝐀(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑖,𝑗 . We note that there are cases where the particular null model deployed 
by this formulation (second term in summand of eq.2) is not suitable e.g. in the case of very broad 
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degree distributions. Squartini and Garlaschelli (2011) provide a condition to assess the suitability of 
this null model, which states that if the maximum degree (𝑘max) is lower than √2𝐿, the null model in 
the original formulation can be used, where L is the total number of links in the network. In our 
case, 𝑘max = 23.88 and √2𝐿 = 54.79, satisfying the condition and in turn, confirming the suitability 
of this particular formulation.  
Once the modules are obtained, we need to confirm that they contain meaningful information i.e. that 
their structure cannot be replicated by a random process. To do so, we use the methodology proposed 
by Clauset (2005) to generate random modular networks with the same number of modules. We then 
use the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) measure (Danon et al., 2005) to compare the modules 
found in the risk network, with the ones found within its random counterpart. An NMI value of 0 
indicates no similarity between the two networks, and a value of 1 if the modules are identical. By 
comparing an ensemble of 1,000 risk networks with their 1,000 artificial counterparts, we obtain an 
NMI value of 0.0749 (standard deviation is 0.0186), confirming the utility of the modules identified. 
Each module is visualized in Section 5, SI. 
Lastly, we note that this particular formulation for 𝑄 (eq.2) is subject to an intrinsic resolution 
limitation, which can bias the process of module identification (Arenas, Fernandez, & Gomez, 2008; 
Fortunato & Barthélemy, 2007; Nicolini, Bordier, & Bifone, 2017). The impact of this limitation can 
be severe as it can lead to the failure of identifying modules smaller than a given scale, resulting in 
modules which are composed of self-consistent, sub-modules. To evaluate whether a module is smaller 
than this scale, and thus subject to this limitation, Fortunato and Barthélemy (2007) used the number of 
links contained within a given module 𝑠, 𝑙𝑠, and 𝐿 to develop the following condition, 𝑙𝑠 < √2𝐿. 
Satisfying this condition means that module 𝑠 is composed of sub-modules, and is therefore not self-
consistent. In our case, 𝑙1 = 307, 𝑙2 = 255, 𝑙3 = 114, 𝑙4 = 143 and  𝑙5 = 90 – all are larger than 
√2𝐿 = 54.79. Hence, our results are robust against the resolution limitations of eq.2, and no sub-
modules are contained within Modules 1-5. 
Evaluating Systemic Impact 
We use a simple ‘Susceptible-Infected’ model to evaluate the total number of risks triggered due to the 
manifestation of risk 𝑖. The state of each risk is defined as ‘materialized’ or ‘non-materialized’, recorded 
as 𝑠 = 1 or 𝑠 = 0 respectively. The algorithm for implementing the ‘Susceptible-Infected’ model is as 
follows: (1) select risk 𝑖 and switch its state from 𝑠𝑖 = 0 to 𝑠𝑖 = 1; (2) identify its neighboring risk(s) 𝑗 
and (3) evaluate whether they are affected by the materialization of risk 𝑖. Step (3) is a probabilistic 
step, where a random value is drawn from a uniform distribution and is compared to the similarity 
between risk 𝑖 and 𝑗 – if the similarity is higher, the state of risk 𝑗 switches to ‘materialized’ 
i.e. 𝐏(𝑠𝑗 = 1|𝑠𝑖 = 1) = 𝐀(𝑖, 𝑗). Once this procedure is completed – either because no more risks are 
left to be affected or because risk 𝑖 has no neighboring node(s) – the number of risks affected is summed 
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and used to define the systemic impact of risk 𝑖. The process is then reiterated across all nodes. Results 
presented herein are an average from 1,000 independent runs.  
The underlying assumption of this process is simple yet powerful: risks with increasingly similar 
characteristics are more likely to be triggered by similar cause(s). With that in mind, step (1) assumes 
that the conditions responsible for triggering risk 𝑖 have been met. Consequently, if risk 𝑗 is increasingly 
similar to risk 𝑖, the met conditions are also likely (but not guaranteed) to trigger risk 𝑗; the probability 
for doing so is determined in step (3). In this spirit, the converse argument is also true i.e. mitigating 
risk 𝑖 suggests that the conditions responsible for it have been treated, and therefore risk 𝑗 is less likely 
to occur, depending on the similarity between the two risks. 
From quantitative to qualitative classification of systemic impact 
The procedure to convert the quantitative results of systemic impact to the classification used in Figure 
4 (i.e. ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’) is as follows: (1) evaluate the number of risks which have a 
reported ‘High’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Low’ independent impact, as found within the original data. This 
breaks down to 61, 58 and 24 risks respectively. For consistency, we preserve this decomposition, by 
(2) ranking risks in terms of their systemic impact and (3) assign the top 61 as ‘High’, the next 58 as 
‘Medium’ and the remaining entries as ‘Low’, in terms of their systemic impact.  
Robustness of Results 
Our results heavily depend on the actual topology of the risk network, which in turn depends on the 
method used to determine risk similarity, in particular using Cosine Distance. Therefore, evaluating the 
dependency of our results to this particular similarity measure an important aspect, as one would hope 
for results to be robust against slightly different measures. To do so, we focus on two key outputs – (a) 
the evident mismatch between independent and systemic risk impact, and (b) the particular modular 
structure that characterizes the risk network – and how these may vary when different similarity 
measures are deployed for the generation of the risk network.  
In general, similarity measures can be categorized in two classes (Lesot, Rifqi, & Benhadda, 2008): (i) 
Type 1, which considers only positive matches between existing attributes as contributors to the overall 
similarity between two vectors (i.e. a particular attribute is present in both vector A and B, hence they 
are increasingly similar); and (ii) Type 2, which considers both positive and negative matches, where 
the absence of a particular attribute further contributes to their similarity (i.e. a particular attribute is 
absent from both in vector A and B, hence they are increasingly similar). In this context, Type 2 
measures are not suitable since negative matches do not necessary imply any similarity between two 
risks, due to the potentially infinite number of attributes that may be lacking in their respective 
characteristic vectors (Choi, Cha, & Tappert, 2010; Sneath & Sokal, 1973). Therefore, we will limit our 
robustness test to Type 1 similarity measures.  
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Type 1 similarity measures can be formalized using three key components: 𝑎, which refers to the 
number of features present in both vectors (i.e. positive matches); 𝑏, the number of attributes that exist 
in vector A and not in B, and 𝑐, the number of attributes that exist in vector B and not in A. Trivially, 
𝑏 + 𝑐 refers to the total number of attributes that exist in vector A (B) and absent from B (A). Given 
this formulation, we consider four widely used, Type 1 similarity measures (Choi et al., 2010): 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
2𝑎
2𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐
 (eq.3) 
 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑 =
𝑎
𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐
 
(eq.4) 
 
𝑆𝑀𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 & 𝑊𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑠 = 1 − (
𝑏 + 𝑐
2𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝑐
) 
(eq.5) 
 
𝑆𝑀𝑆𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑖 =
𝑎2
(𝑎 + 𝑏)(𝑎 + 𝑐)
 
(eq.6) 
With respect to finding (a) – mismatch between independent and systemic impact – we repeat the 
analysis described in Methods, Evaluating Systemic Impact. For every additional similarity measure 
tested, we generate the respective adjacency matrix and rerun the ‘Susceptible-Infected’ model for 
1,000 independent runs. In general, the number of risks where Systemic Impact is greater, or equal to, 
their Independent Impact is consistent across all similarity measures, highlighting the robustness of 
finding (a) – see Table 4. Therefore, results related to finding (a) are robust. 
Table 4: Number of risks that illustrate a particular mismatch between Systemic and Independent 
Impact 
Distance measure used to 
generate risk network 
Number of risks whose 
Systemic Impact ≥ 
Independent Impact 
Number of risks whose 
Systemic Impact < 
Independent Impact 
Cosine 96 47 
Dice 95 48 
Jaccard 95 48 
Lance & Williams 95 48 
Sorgenfrei 94 49 
 
With respect to finding (b) – the existence of a particular modular structure – we repeat the analysis 
described in Methods, Module Identification. For every additional similarity measure tested, we first 
generate an ensemble of 1,000 networks. For each ensemble, we identify the most frequent module in 
which each risk is assigned to, and compare that with its respective module assignment obtained using 
Cosine Distance.  Figure 5 maps the overall match between the cluster assignment obtained using 
Cosine Distance, and the additional similarity measures. In general, module assignment under Dice, 
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Jaccard, and Lance & Williams similarity measures is almost identical to the one obtained using Cosine 
Distance. This is not the case for Sorgenfrei, where the match is poor.  
 
Figure 5: Match between module assignment obtained using Cosine Distance and other similarity 
measures (bar). A value of 1 indicates a complete match. 
To identify the cause for this poor match, we performed a simple experiment to assess the sensitivity of 
each measure with respect to vector similarity.  Consider vector A and B, the first being composed of 
0s and the latter of 1s – at this point the similarity between A and B is 0. At each time step, vector A 
becomes incrementally similar to vector B by randomly choosing a 0 entry and switching its value to 
1. Therefore, vector A becomes increasingly similar to vector B at every time step, until they become 
identical – at this point the similarity between A and B is 1. By monitoring the increase in similarity 
using different similarity measures, we can assess the sensitivity of each measure. In this case, 
superlinear behavior corresponds to heightened sensitivity, whilst sublinear behavior corresponds to 
reduced sensitivity – see Figure 6. Evidently, measures that have a good match in terms of reporting the 
same modules – Cosine, Dice, Jaccard; Lance & Williams; Figure 5, bar 1 to 3 – are ones that grow at 
least linearly with increased similarity, whilst measures that grow sublinearly – Sorgenfrei; Figure 5, 
bar 4 – perform poorly.  
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of each similarity measure (markers) as a function of increasingly similar vectors 
(x-axis). A symmetry line y-x is also included for reference.  
To assess the generalizability of this statement, we define an additional measure designed to grow 
minimally with increased similarity (𝑆𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
min(
𝑎
𝑏+𝑐
.𝑎+𝑏+𝑐)
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐
) – see Figure 7a. As expected, the 
performance of this measure is exceedingly poor when considering the resulting cluster assignment, in 
relation to the ones obtained using Cosine Distance (Figure 7b). 
 
Figure 7: subplot (a) and (b) are the same as Figure 6 and Figure 5, with an explicit focus on comparing 
the newly introduced similarity measure (x marker) with Cosine Distance (square markers),     
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In conclusion, this section tests the dependency of the reported results with respect to the adopted 
similarity measure. The focus is on: (a) the evident mismatch between independent and systemic risk 
impact, and (b) the particular modular structure that characterizes the risk network. Both (a) and (b) are 
robust against the use of similar similarity measures, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 5 respectively. 
However, the robustness of (b) has an additional caveat – the measure used to evaluate similarity grow 
at least linearly with respect to the number of shared characteristics (Figure 6). Considering the nature 
of the data examined herein, this is a reasonable expectation as every additional positive match between 
two characteristic vectors contributes to the similarity of their respective risks. 
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